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Introduction
The new Bank of Israel Law of 2010 changed decisionmaking at the Bank of Israel in a fundamental way, from a setup where monetary policy decisions are taken by the governor to one where decisions are taken by a committee of voting members. The former setup dated from 1954, when the (old)
Bank of Israel Law established the Bank and vested its governor with full authority over the conduct of monetary policy. Although the law provided for an advisory committee, the committee was appointed by the governor and the law did not compel the governor to follow its advice. Thus, in some sense, this setup is akin to the "single central banker" in the literature. In contrast, the new law creates a Monetary Committee and entrusts it with setting the key interest rate. The Committee includes the governor as its chair, along with two other Bank sta¤ and three external members. Decisions are passed by a majority of voting members, with the governor casting an extra vote in case of a tie. Thus, the new setup is one where decisions are taken collectively by a group of policy makers.
In this paper, we use this institutional change at the Bank of Israel as a natural experiment to compare collective and individual decisionmaking. The issue is important because many economic decisions are taken by a group, rather than by a single individual. Examples include public spending and taxation decisions taken by legislatures, legal judgements made by appellate courts, and interest rate decisions taken by monetary policy committees in many central banks. The way a committee aggregates the di¤erent preferences of its members depends on the particular voting procedure that is adopted either implicitly or explicitly by the group. Except under the stringent assumptions of the median voter theorem, decisions taken by a group will be di¤erent from those taken by an individual (the median). In particular, the median preferred policy does not prevail in instances when only a subset of alternatives are put to a vote (see, for example, Romer and Rosenthal, 1978, and Krehbiel, 1998) or when the group makes decisions by supermajority rule, that is, by requiring a level of support that exceeds a simple majority. 1 The empirical evaluation of the di¤erence between collective and individual decisionmaking is complicated by the fact that it generally involves comparing institutions in di¤erent countries. Since countries may be di¤erent in ways other than in their institutions, it is di¢ cult to know whether di¤erent policy decisions are the result of di¤erent institutions or of the di¤erent environments in which the institutions act. One strategy to address this identi…cation problem is to study an institutional change, say from individual to collective decisionmaking, in the same country. This is precisely what happened in Israel with the introduction of the new Bank of Israel Law in 2010.
1
Other countries have experienced a similar institutional change (e.g., the United Kingdom in 1997 and Sweden in 1999), but Israel is ideal for this study for several reasons. First, the Bank of Israel has always used …xed decision dates for policy announcements. This means that we observe all policy decisions regardless of whether the decision was to adjust the interest rate or to keep it …xed. In contrast, for central banks without …xed announcement dates, we observe interest rate adjustments (because they are announced), but without inside information, it is di¢ cult to know when an adjustment was considered with the …nal decision being to keep the rate unchanged.
Second, the introduction of the committee was not accompanied by a change in governor: Stanley Fischer was governor for …ve and a half years before the new law was enacted and three and a half years afterwards. This allows us to rule out the change in governorship as a potential source of variation in the data. Finally, although the law updated other aspects of the Bank's governance, we argue that they represent a less dramatic change than it may appear because, in some sense, the new law simply recognized the reality on the ground.
The main result from this project is that the status quo bias is larger when decisions are taken by a committee than when they are taken by a single individual. First, we document di¤erent dynamics for interest rate decisions before and after the new Bank of Israel Law. We argue that this di¤erence is unlikely to be the result of other changes in the Bank's governance that were updated by the new law or of a change in governorship. We address the possibility that the di¤erence in economic conditions across the two periods may account for the di¤erence in decision dynamics by performing counterfactual experiments where we estimate the decisions that a committee would have taken if faced with the same in ‡ation and unemployment as a governor prior to the new law, and vice versa. We conclude that economic conditions cannot completely account for the di¤erence in policy decisions.
International evidence shows a clear trend towards more central banks making decisions by committee rather than by a single individual (see Blinder, 2004) . The usual argument in favor of committee decisionmaking is that it draws and aggregates diverse viewpoints and thus ensures moderate and informed decisions. Our analysis points to the fact that monetary policy making by a committee features fewer interest rate changes and smaller adjustments than policymaking by a single individual. Put di¤erently, we provide empirical evidence for the commonly held conjecture that committee decisionmaking is more inertial than individual decisionmaking. 2 Whether this larger inertia improves welfare is an issue that is beyond the scope of this paper and is left to future research.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes decisionmaking at the Bank of Israel under its old and new organic laws. Section 3 describes the data on interest rate decisions and reports key empirical observations. Section 4 presents protocols that represent individual and collective decisionmaking, reports estimates of the parameters obtained using Israeli data, and reports the results of counterfactual experiments. Finally, section 5 summarizes the main results of our analysis.
Decisionmaking at the Bank of Israel
The Bank of Israel (BOI) was established under the Bank of Israel Law of 1954. According to the law, the governor was responsible for monetary policy decisions, with input from an advisory committee. The committee consisted of no more than 11 members, with at least seven of the members not in the employ of the Bank. However, the role of the committee was primarily consultative, and the governor had substantial power vis-à-vis the committee. First, all of its members were appointed by the governor. The chair of the committee was selected by the governor as well. Second, terms in the committee were relatively short (two years) and renewable. Thus, the governor had considerable short-term control over the composition of the committee. Third, the committee met only once a month, by written invitation from its chair, or whenever convened by the governor.
Finally, the law required the governor to consult the committee (see § 21 in c. 5), but it did not compel the governor to follow its advice, and, in practice, there were instances when the gover- The meetings of the committee usually take place over the course of two days and are in the form 3 of a "broad forum" followed by a "narrow forum." In the broad forum, the committee members, senior representatives from the Bank departments, and economists from the Research and Market Operations departments discuss current economic conditions. In the narrow forum, the directors of Research and Market Operations departments present their recommendations regarding the interest rate, and, after an open discussion, the committee members vote on the level of the interest rate.
A report on the meetings is published with a two-week delay. The report contains a summary of the material presented in the broad forum, a summary of the discussion in the narrow forum, an explanation of the key considerations underlying the decision, and the decision itself, including the outcome of the vote. The report states whether the decision was unanimous or whether there were dissents. In the latter case, the report states the policy preference of the dissenter, but it does not reveal his or her identity. Like the EB, it has an even number of members, with the governor holding tie-breaking power. As with both of these committees, decisions are formally taken by simple majority and dissents are made public. One di¤erence, however, is that in the MPC and the EB, the identity of the dissenter is revealed in the minutes, while it is not in the Monetary Committee.
It is important to keep in mind in interpreting the results of this study that the new Bank of Israel Law also updated two other key aspects of the Bank's governance. First, the law de…nes price stability as the Bank's main objective, with the secondary goals of supporting other government economic objectives (growth, employment, and reducing social gaps) and the stability of the …nancial system. However, the law states that this support should not prejudice the attainment of price stability over time, de…ned as the return of in ‡ation to its target range within no more than two years (see § 3 in c. 3). The old law mentioned the dual objective of "promoting by monetary measures (1) the stabilization of the value of the currency in Israel and outside Israel; and (2) a high level of production, employment, national income and capital investments in Israel"( § 3 in c.
3).
Under both laws, maintaining the purchasing power of the currency and promoting output growth are objectives, but under the new law the latter is clearly subordinated to the former except (possibly) in the short term. Cukierman (2007) argues that the de facto weight given to price stability in the pre-1985 period was less than the de jure weight, in part because of the use of BOI-directed credit to promote the development of certain sectors. After the in ‡ation stabilization plan of 1985 and the introduction of in ‡ation targets in 1992, there was a steady increase in the 4 emphasis on price stability in the decisionmaking process at the BOI and a corresponding decrease in the emphasis on output objectives (Cukierman, 2007, p. 12) .
As part of the construction of his index of central bank independence, Cukierman summarizes quantitatively institutional information about the importance of price stability in policymaking.
In particular, he speci…es a code that ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 corresponding to the case where price stability is not one of goals in the charter of the central bank and 1 corresponding to the case where it is the only or a major goal. 3 (2008), who argues that the new law provides "a proper legal basis for the reality that has been created."
In summary, we argue that while these two dimensions of the new law-the emphasis on price stability and the stated autonomy of the Bank of Israel-are important, they represent a less dramatic change than would at …rst appear because, in some sense, they simply acknowledge the reality on the ground.
Finally, we compute the number of dissents in each meeting of the Monetary Committee. From October 2011 to December 2015, out of a total of 51 meetings, there were 16 meetings with at least one dissent, four meetings with more than one dissent, and one meeting where the governor used his tie-breaking power (on 13 May 2013). Thus, the fraction of meetings where at least one member dissents is 0.31. 6 The dissenting data has two features. First, the occurrence of dissent is higher in the two years immediately after the Monetary Committee became operational. In this period, the fraction of meetings with one or more dissents is 0.52. Second, most dissents are from members who prefer an interest rate higher than the one agreed upon by the committee. We …nd, in fact, that in 11 (resp. …ve ) meetings, dissenters wanted a tighter (resp. looser) policy stance than desired by the committee as a whole. Overall, these statistics indicate that there exists a signi…cant amount of disagreement at the meetings of the Monetary Committee of the Bank of Israel, comparable to that observed in committees in other central banks. These observations suggest that the new law of 2010 has implied a real, and not just a formal, change in the way in which monetary policy decisions are made.
The Data 3.1 Interest Rate Decisions
We collected data on 257 monetary policy decisions at the Bank of Israel for the 21 years from January 1995 to December 2015. Decisions concern the headline interest rate, which is the benchmark rate for commercial banks in Israel. Decisions are announced monthly, usually in the last 10 days of the month, and in the past, they took the form of a Monetary Program for the incoming month. In our sample, there is only one month (April 2001) when no decision was announced. 7 In extraordinary circumstances, additional interest rate decisions were made during the course of the month. For example, the headline rate was raised by 150 basis points on 9 June 2002, and it was cut by 50 basis points on 7 October 2008, during the …nancial crisis. However, this situation is rare and in our sample there are only seven of such instances. The raw data were taken from the Bank of Israel's website (www.bankisrael.gov.il). However, the available data concern only the "e¤ective" headline rate during the month, and, so in order to construct a series on interest rate decisions, we completed these data using information from Bloomberg and o¢ cial press releases. Since 1992 the Bank of Israel pursues an in ‡ation target and uses the short-term (headline) interest rate as the policy instrument to attain the target. Thus, the monetary policy framework is stable during our sample and we can rule out a change in framework as a source of variation in the data. where an interest rate adjustment in one direction was followed by an adjustment in the opposite direction in the next month (in January and July 1996).
Empirical Observations
In order to quantify these observations, we report in table 1 the key statistics for each sub- The hypothesis that the variance of interest rate changes is the same in both sub-samples can be tested using an F -test. The alternative is that the variance is larger in the …rst than in the second sub-sample. Denote the standard deviation and sample size of the …rst sub-sample by S 1 and n 1 and those of the second sub-sample by S 2 and n 2 . Then, the statistic S 2 1 =S 2 2 follows an F 8 After the interest rate decision of March 2015, the key interest rate in Israel is e¤ectively at the zero lower-bound, and it has been …xed to 0:1% since. Excluding these recent observations from the sample has basically no e¤ect on the estimate of the standard deviation of interest rate adjustments: dropping these observations, the estimate becomes 11 basis points rather than the 14 points reported in table 1. 8 distribution with (n 1 1) and (n 2 1) degrees of freedom. Since the test statistic is 11:28 and is much larger than the 5% critical value of 1:67, the hypothesis can be safely rejected in favor of the alternative (p-value < 0:001). Thus, we conclude that the variance of interest rate changes under the old law is signi…cantly larger than under the new law.
The hypothesis that the proportion of observations where the interest rate is left unchanged is the same in both sub-samples can be tested for as well. In this case, the alternative is that the proportion is larger in the second than in the …rst sub-sample. Under the null hypothesis, the statistic (p 2 p 1 )= p p(1 p)(1=n 1 + 1=n 2 ) is normally distributed, with p 1 ; p 2 , and p standing for the proportion in, respectively, the …rst sub-sample, the second sub-sample, and the complete sample. Since the statistic is 4:46 and is larger than the 5% critical value of 1:64, we conclude that the proportion of decisions that involve keeping the interest rate unchanged is signi…cantly larger under the new law than under the old law (p-value < 0:001).
It is interesting to note that the proportion of BOI decisions under the new law where the rate is left unchanged is quantitatively very similar to the proportion observed in the Bank of England (0:73) and the Riksbank (0:68), 9 whose committees have a structure similar to that of the BOI Monetary Committee. Table 1 also shows that there are some di¤erences as well in the standard deviation and autocorrelation of interest rate changes across the samples for the three single bankers, but that the proportion of no-changes is relatively stable. The di¤erences between these samples are qualitatively and quantitatively smaller than the di¤erences between them as a whole and the sample after the new law took e¤ect. Overall, these results support the view that the status quo bias is larger when decisions are taken by a committee than when they are taken by a single individual.
An important feature of the BOI data is that the institutional change towards committee decisionmaking took place without a concurrent change in governor. Instead, the same individual The test of the hypothesis that the variance of interest changes is the same in both Fisher sub-samples can be rejected against the alternative that the variance in the …rst sub-sample is larger than in the second sub-sample (p-value = 0:002). Also, the test of the hypothesis that the proportion of no interest rate changes is the same in both sub-samples can be rejected against the alternative that it is larger in the second than in the …rst sub-sample (p-value = 0:044). Although these results should be interpreted with caution because the sample sizes are small and because the …nancial crisis took place during Fisher's …rst term as governor, they are consistent with the view that the dynamics of interest rate decisions are di¤erent under the new than under the old law, even when the governor was the same. 
Counterfactual Experiments

Protocols
Assume that preferences are single-peaked and that the interest rate preferred by policy maker n at time t is i n;t = a n + b t + cy t + t ;
where i t is the nominal interest rate, t is in ‡ation, y t is an output measure, a n is an individualspeci…c intercept, b and c are constant coe¢ cients, and t is a disturbance term assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and variance 2 . 10 A model that delivers (1) as the solution to an optimization problem by member n in a new Keynesian environment was developed in our previous work (Riboni and Ruge-Murcia, 2010) , where the di¤erence in intercepts across policy makes arises from di¤erent degrees of relative prudence with respect to a common in ‡ation target. 11 Because individual reaction functions di¤er in their intercepts only, it is easy to see that economic shocks or changes in output/in ‡ation shift the preferred interest rates of all committee members, without a¤ecting the ordering.
First, consider the case where the interest rate is selected by one policy maker alone. In the absence of frictions, this single central banker will select her preferred interest rate, i n;t , in every period. Thus, under this protocol, the policy outcome is
The assumptions in this protocol-that is, one policy maker and no frictions-are implicit in most of the literature that derives Taylor-type rules as the optimal solution to a linear-quadratic problem (for example, Woodford, 2001 ). Now, assume that the interest rate is selected by a committee composed of N members and that the committee makes decisions by consensus. We model consensus using the protocol in Riboni and
Ruge-Murcia (2010), where it is shown that this consensus model …ts actual policy decisions better than alternative models of committee decisionmaking (e.g., the agenda-setting model of Romer and Rosenthal, 1978) . In particular, the better …t is also obtained for committees that operate formally under a simple majority rule, such as those at the Bank of England, the Swedish Riksbank, and the US Federal Reserve. The consensus model is a two-part protocol where members …rst decide by simple majority the direction of the interest rate change and then vote sequentially on the size of the increment with a super majority of votes required for a proposal to pass. 12 More formally, we order committee members according to their preferred interest rate so that individual 1 is the member with the lowest preferred rate, N is the member with the highest preferred rate, and the median member is the one with index m = (N + 1)=2. For convenience, we assume that N is odd. Denote by q t the status quo policy in the current meeting, which corresponds to the interest rate selected in the previous meeting. In the …rst part of the meeting, members decide by simple majority whether the interest rate will be increased or decreased. Suppose, for example, that the committee decides to increase the interest rate. Then, all policy alternatives strictly smaller than q t are discarded, and in the second part of the meeting members vote on successive -size increases of the interest rate, where is in…nitesimally small. This vote is subject to a super majority rule that requires that for a proposal to pass, the number of favorable votes, (N + 1)=2 + k, needs to be strictly larger than simple majority, (N + 1)=2, where k 1 is the size of the super majority. Voting proceeds as follows. Members …rst vote on the proposal q t + against the alternative q t . If the proposal does not receive the support of a super majority of members, then the proposal is defeated and the interest rate adopted by the committee is i t = q t . Alternatively, if the proposal passes, members vote on a new proposal, q t + 2 , against the alternative q t + .
This procedure continues until a proposal fails to have the support of a super majority of members.
As explained in Riboni and Ruge-Murcia (2010), the focus is on a pure-strategy, sub-game perfect equilibrium with the property that members vote as if they were pivotal. Members are assumed to be forward-looking within each meeting, but they abstract from the e¤ects of their voting decision on future meetings via the status quo. The policy outcome in the consensus protocol is 13
if i m k;t 6 q t 6 i m+k;t ; i m k;t ; if q t < i m k;t :
Note that this protocol induces an inaction interval, that is, a set of status quo policies where interest rate changes are not possible. For an initial status quo in the inaction interval, regardless of the result in the …rst part of the meeting, no proposal will pass in the second stage and the interest rate will remain unchanged. The width of the inaction interval is equal to the distance between the policies preferred by members with indices m + k and m k and is increasing in the size of the supermajority. When instead status quo policies are su¢ ciently extreme, compared with the values preferred by most members, the committee adopts a new policy that is closer, but not equal, to the median outcome.
Estimation
For the estimation of the model, we use the interest rate decisions described above and mea- Results from these experiments are reported in table 3 and show that interest rate adjustments in this period would have been characterized by a higher standard deviation and more interest rate adjustments than observed in the actual data, where decisions were made by a committee. An interesting observation is that the autocorrelation would have been similar to that in the data.
Experiments
The reason is that the single banker model features relatively low endogenous persistence and its persistence derives directly from that of in ‡ation and unemployment. not allow us to make statements about social welfare, and hence we cannot conclude whether the inertia associated with committee decisionmaking is welfare improving. This is an important issue that we leave for future research.
Conclusions
Appendix A Model of Individually Preferred Interest Rates
The utility function of a generic member n is
where E denotes the expectation conditional on information available at time ; 2 (0; 1) is the discount factor, and U n ( t ) is the instantaneous utility function. Assume that
where is an in ‡ation target and n is a member-speci…c preference parameter. The functional form (A1) is based on Varian (1974) .
As in Svensson (1997) , the behavior of the private sector is summarized by a Phillips curve,
and an aggregate demand curve,
where t is in ‡ation, y t is an output measure, i t is the nominal interest rate, is the real interest rate, 1 ; 2 > 0 and 0 < 1 < 1 are constant parameters, and t and " t are disturbances. The disturbances follow the moving average processes
where L is the lag operator, the roots of (1 1 x) and (1 & 1 x) lie outside the unit circle, and u t and v t are mutually independent innovations. The innovations are normally distributed white noises with zero mean and constant conditional variances 2 u and 2 v ; respectively. Before proceeding, note from (A2) and (A3) that in the model the interest rate at time t a¤ects in ‡ation only after two periods.
Consider the member-speci…c interest rate i n;t chosen at time t to maximize the expected utility of member n at time t + 2. That is,
15 subject to equations (A2) and (A3). Because of the shocks that occur during the control lag period, ex-post in ‡ation will typically di¤er from . This induces a prudence motive in the conduct of monetary policy which varies with n . The …rst-order necessary condition is E t exp ( n ( t+2 )) = 1:
Under the assumption that innovations are normally distributed, the in ‡ation rate at time t+2 (conditional on the information available at time t) is also normally distributed. Thus, exp ( n ( t+2 ))
is distributed log-normal with mean exp n (E t t+2 ) + 2 n 2 =2 where 2 stands for the conditional variance of t : Substituting into (A4) and taking logs,
Finally, using equations (A2) and (A3), write the interest rate preferred by member n as i n;t = a n + b t + cy t + t ;
where a n = (1= 1 2 ) + ( n =2 1 2 ) 2 ; (A6) b = 1 + (1= 1 2 ); c = (1 + 1 )= 2 ; and t is a white-noise disturbance formed from the linear combination of the innovations u t and v t . The superscripts and y denote signi…cance at the 5% and 10% signi…cance levels, respectively. 
